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better with Asians in the ªnal ones, and practically ignoring Native
Americans throughout. Moreover, Kramer tends to treat American ra-
cial views as static. He misses, for instance, that the Japanese victory in
the Russo-Japanese War led many Americans to question the “race” of
the Japanese and that views on American Indians covered a broad range,
shifting dramatically during the period that he covers. Although these
views are clearly not his focus, by ignoring them he misses an opportu-
nity to show how American-Filipino negotiation was constrained and
shaped by pre-existing American beliefs.
In the end, Kramer’s well-researched book is unusual in that it cov-
ers almost the full spectrum of American control of the Philippines. His
argument about the politics behind the Tydings-McDufªe Act and his
use of a transnational context are groundbreaking.
Anne Paulet
Humboldt State University
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During the campaign to restrict suffrage in the late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century South, upper-class Democrats from heavily African
American areas urged all whites, regardless of geography, class, or past
partisanship, to recall the “horrors” of Reconstruction and unite behind
the “reforms,” pledging that legal means to disfranchise nearly all blacks,
but no whites, were possible. Feldman contends that poor whites were
so strongly and irrationally racist that they believed the Democrats’
empty promises, ignored their own economic and political self-interest,
and committed political suicide (9–10, 23, 136). Often heavy-handedly
attacking Woodward, Webb, and this reviewer as credulous propagators
of “the disfranchisement Myth” that “plain” white anti-Democratic-
party sympathizers opposed suffrage restriction, Feldman seeks to restore
the white-consensus view of southern politics, shorn of its original racist
purposes (3–11, 123).1 Misrepresenting the views of the historians that
he attacks, distorting or ignoring evidence to ªt his thesis, and perform-
ing only the most simplistic statistical analysis of election returns,
Feldman fails as badly as the disfranchisers did to obscure white disunity.
No historian has, as Feldman charges, “portray[ed] solidarity against
ratiªcation [of the 1901 constitution] among poor whites in north Ala-
bama and the Hill Country” (115); none has argued that poor-white rac-
ism “meant nothing in real terms” (8); and all have understood, since
646 | J . M O R G A N KO U S S E R
1 See C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877–1913 (Baton Rouge, 1951); Sam-
uel L. Webb, Two-Party Politics in the One-Party South: Alabama’s Hill Country, 1874–1920
(Tuscaloosa, 1997); Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Estab-
lishment of the One-Party South, 1880–1910 (New Haven, 1974).
Woodward pioneered the argument in Tom Watson in 1938, that some
Populists shed any signs of racial liberalism after Democrats counted
them out and discouraged many of their followers from voting (77).
What the historians that Feldman attacks have contended is that white
Populists and Republicans, along with some hill-country Democrats,
were much more likely to oppose disfranchising laws and constitutional
amendments than Democrats from the Black Belt and upper-status
Democrats everywhere were. In contrast to Feldman, who offers a static
consensus view, those that he seeks to refute have emphasized the diver-
gent and shifting class and partisan interests among whites, the impor-
tance of preconstitutional disfranchising laws—such as the Sayre Law in
Alabama that Feldman almost entirely ignores—and changes and ºuidity
in late nineteenth-century southern white attitudes and behavior.
Feldman sees an undifferentiated forest; we see clumps of trees of differ-
ent species, sizes, and ages.
Feldman’s equation of Populists and white Republicans with “poor
whites” and any residents of majority-white counties allows him to treat
any statement from anyone in a majority-white county and any election
return from such an area as representing anti-Democratic sentiment
(122, 146). Rather than attempting to draw a representative sample of
“plain white” opinion, he quotes not only scattered Populists and for-
mer Populists but, even more often, upper-class plantation, corporate, or
merely partisan Democrats, as reºective of Populist views (26–27, 77,
94–106, 112, 115, 144–45, 158). His opinion sample is not just unsys-
tematic; it is ºagrantly biased.
More than thirty years ago, I employed ecological regression analy-
sis to estimate how Alabamians who had supported the Populists in ear-
lier gubernatorial contests voted in the referendums for calling the 1901
constitutional convention and ratifying its handiwork. This statistical
technique took into account turnout and choice differences between
voters in each county. In contrast, Feldman merely groups counties into
those that were majority white or majority Populist and calculates the
average white-county and Populist-county percentages for each side in
the referenda, downplaying the speciªc county-level votes. He also as-
sumes, without any evidence whatsoever, that the ballot-box stufªng
that so obviously distorted the returns from the most heavily African
American counties was absent in white-majority counties, an assump-
tion belied by percentages for disfranchisement in several counties that
greatly exceeded their white percentages.
Feldman’s bluster should not obscure the weakness of his evidence,
research design, and qualitative and quantitative methods. The myth is
that he has refuted anyone’s contentions about disfranchisement.
J. Morgan Kousser
California Institute of Technology
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